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Abstract 
Much evidence suggests that people are concerned with their relative consumption, i.e., their 
own consumption relative to that of others. Yet, conspicuous consumption and the 
corresponding social costs have so far been ignored in savings-based indicators of sustainable 
development. The present paper examines the implications of relative consumption concerns 
for measures of sustainable development by deriving analogues to genuine saving when 
people are concerned with their relative consumption. Unless the positional externalities have 
been fully internalized, an indicator of such externalities must be added to genuine saving to 
arrive at the proper measure of intertemporal welfare change. A numerical example based on 
U.S. and Swedish data suggests that conventional measures of genuine saving (which do not 
reflect conspicuous consumption) are likely to largely overestimate this welfare change. We 
also show how relative consumption concerns affect the way public investment ought to be 
reflected in genuine saving. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of genuine saving has gained much attention in literature on welfare 
measurement in dynamic economies. Genuine saving is an indicator of comprehensive net 
investment in the sense of summarizing the value of all capital formation undertaken by 
society over a time period. Earlier research shows that the genuine saving constitutes an exact 
measure of welfare change over a short time interval if the resource allocation is first best.1 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
genuine saving has also become an indicator of sustainable development. The World 
Commission defines the development to be sustainable if it meets “the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Our 
Common Future, 1987, page 54)
2
. One possible interpretation is that sustainable development 
requires welfare to be non-declining, meaning that genuine saving becomes an exact indicator 
of sustainable development over a short time interval.
3
 Another is that the instantaneous 
utility must not exceed its maximum sustainable level, on the basis of which Pezzey (2004) 
shows that non-positive genuine saving constitutes an indicator of unsustainable development, 
although positive genuine saving does not necessarily imply that development is sustainable.
4
 
In either case, genuine saving gives information of clear practical relevance for economic 
welfare.
5
 
Yet, the literature dealing with genuine saving has so far focused on traditional 
neoclassical textbook models, where people derive utility solely from their own absolute 
consumption of goods and services (broadly defined). As such, it neglects the possibility 
                                                          
1
 The seminal contributions are Pearce and Atkinson (1993) and Hamilton (1994, 1996). See also Hamilton 
(2010) for a recent overview of the literature and van der Ploeg (2010) for a political economy analysis of 
genuine saving. A public economics approach is taken by Aronsson et al. (2012), who derive a second-best 
analogue to genuine saving in a representative-agent economy with distortionary taxes and public debt 
accumulation, while Li and Löfgren (2012) address genuine saving in an economy where growth is stochastic. 
See also the  recent empirical application by Greasley et al. (2014), who test the welfare significance of genuine 
saving based on historical data from Britain, and Fleurbaey (2015) for an examination of relationships between 
social welfare and measures of sustainable development (including genuine saving).  
2
 This report is often referred to as The Brundtland Report. 
3
 See, e.g., Arrow et al. (2003). 
4
 See also Pezzey (1993) and Asheim (1994). 
5
 This is further emphasized by the attention paid to genuine saving by the World Bank, which regularly 
publishes estimates of genuine saving for a large number of countries.  
3 
 
discussed in behavioral economics literature that people also enjoy consuming more, and 
dislike consuming less than others – an idea that appeared rather obvious to many leading 
economists of the past such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall, 
Thorstein Veblen, and Arthur Pigou, before it became unfashionable in the beginning of the 
20
th
 century. 
The purpose of the present paper is to examine how relative consumption concerns, 
through a preference for “keeping-up-with-the-Joneses,” affect the principles for measuring 
welfare change. It will then present a correspondingly adjusted measure of genuine saving. 
Arguably, such a study is relevant for several reasons. First, there is now a large body of 
empirical evidence showing that people are concerned with their relative consumption, (and 
not just their absolute consumption as in standard economic models).
6
 Questionnaire-
experimental research often concludes that 30-50 percent of an individual’s utility gain from 
increased consumption may actually be due to increased relative consumption (e.g., Alpizar et 
al., 2005; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007). Similarly, happiness-based 
studies typically find that a large (or even dominating) share of consumption-induced well-
being in industrialized countries is due to relative effects (e.g., Luttmer, 2005; Easterlin, 2001; 
Easterlin et al., 2010). In turn, this may distort the incentives underlying consumption and 
capital formation. Second, based on the estimates referred to above, wasteful conspicuous 
consumption is likely to result in significant welfare costs, which – if not properly internalized 
– may change the principles for calculating welfare change-equivalent measures of saving. 
Indeed, we show that the more positional people are on average, the more will the 
conventional measure of genuine saving (where people are assumed not to have positional 
preferences) overestimate the true welfare change. Third, recent literature shows that optimal 
policy rules for public expenditure are modified in response to relative consumption 
concerns,
7
 suggesting that such concerns may also affect the value of public investment in the 
context of genuine saving. This will be further discussed below. 
                                                          
6
 See, e.g., Easterlin (2001), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005), Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Carlsson et al. (2007), Clark and Senik 
(2010), and Corazzini, Esposito, and Majorano (2012). See also Fliessbach et al. (2007) and Dohmen et al. 
(2011) for evidence based on brain science and Rayo and Becker (2007) for an evolutionary approach. 
7
 See Ng (1987), Brekke and Howarth (2002), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2014b), and Wendner 
and Goulder (2008), who analyze different aspects of public good provision in economies where people are 
concerned with their relative consumption. 
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We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where each consumer derives utility 
from his/her own consumption and use of leisure, respectively, and from his/her relative 
consumption compared with a reference consumption level (reflecting other people’s 
consumption). In the benchmark model, the relative consumption comparisons are of the 
keeping-up-with-the-Joneses type, meaning that each individual compares his/her current 
consumption with the current consumption of referent others, which is the case that best 
corresponds to the empirical evidence discussed above. However, we will also – although 
briefly – touch upon catching-up-with-the-Joneses comparisons, where the reference measure 
refers to other people’s past consumption, and argue that the associated externalities affect the 
welfare change measure in the same general way as the externalities following from keeping-
up-with-the-Joneses types of comparisons. 
Our main contribution is that we show how positional concerns influence the way welfare-
change equivalent savings ought to be measured. We distinguish between a social optimum 
where all externalities are internalized, and imperfect market economies without externality 
correction. We also distinguish between first-best and second-best social optima by extending 
the benchmark model to allow for asymmetric information between the consumers and the 
social planner (or government). Furthermore, by using insights developed in the literature on 
tax and other policy responses to relative consumption concerns, we are also able to relate 
genuine saving to empirical measures of “degrees of positionality,” i.e., the extent to which 
relative consumption is important for individual well-being. 
The paper closest in spirit to ours is Aronsson and Löfgren (2008). They consider the 
problem of calculating an analogue to Weitzman’s (1976) welfare-equivalent net national 
product in an economy where the consumers are characterized by habit formation. Their 
results show that if the habits are fully internalized through consumer choices, habit formation 
does not change the basic principles for measuring welfare (except that the individual’s own 
past consumption affects his/her current instantaneous utility). However, with external habit 
formation, i.e., if the habits partly reflect other people’s past consumption, the present value 
of this marginal externality affects the welfare measure through an addition to the 
comprehensive net national product. Our study differs from Aronsson and Löfgren (2008) in 
at least four distinct ways: we (i) consider measures of genuine saving (or analogues thereof) 
instead of net national product measures, (ii) focus attention on the empirically well-
established keeping-up-with-Joneses type of comparison, (iii) allow for redistributive aspects 
5 
 
by considering a case with heterogeneous consumers, and (iv) introduce public investments 
into the study of welfare change-equivalent savings.
8
 
The paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we present the benchmark model where 
each individual derives utility from consuming more than other people. We also present 
useful indicators of the extent to which relative consumption matters for individual well-
being. Following earlier literature on genuine saving, we assume in the benchmark model that 
individuals are identical. In Section 3, we use the benchmark model to analyze economy-wide 
measures of welfare change. Sections 4 and 5 present two extensions by addressing catching-
up-with-the-Joneses comparisons and public investments, respectively. Section 6 examines a 
more general model with two ability types that differ in productivity, where productivity is 
private information not observable to the social planner. Such a model allows us to extend the 
welfare analysis to a second-best model that includes both redistribution and externality 
correction subject to an incentive constraint. Section 7 presents a numerical example based on 
data for Sweden and the U.S., while Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Benchmark Model and Equilibrium 
Consider an economy with a constant population comprising identical individuals, whose 
number is normalized to one.
9
 The assumption of identical individuals is made for purposes of 
simplification; all qualitative results that we derive for this representative agent model would 
carry over in a natural way to a framework with heterogeneous consumers, as long as the 
redistribution policy can be implemented through lump-sum taxation. We will first, in 
Subsection 2.1, define the instantaneous utility function, which forms the basis for the 
subsequent measures of welfare change when people care about relative consumption. In 
Subsection 2.2 we consider the production side of the economy, where output is a function of 
labor and capital, before dealing with the dynamic optimization problem of individuals as 
well as the social planner. 
                                                          
8
 Yamaguchi (2014) uses the representative-agent model developed in Aronsson and Löfgren (2008) to derive an 
indicator of genuine saving. He examines conditions under which the value of investment in physical capital and 
the value of investment in the stock of habits jointly contribute to increased welfare in a social optimum. As 
such, his analysis has a very different focus from ours. 
9
 To be able to focus on the implications of relative consumption concerns in a simple way, we abstract from 
population growth. Genuine saving under population growth is addressed by Pezzey (2004). See also Asheim 
(2004). 
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2.1 Instantaneous Utility Function and the Degree of Positionality 
Let c denote private consumption and z leisure. Similarly to the models analyzed in 
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010), the instantaneous utility function faced by the 
representative individual takes the form 
 ( , , ) ( , , )t t t t t t tU u c z c z c   ,                   (1) 
where the variable t t tc c    denotes the individual’s relative consumption and is defined as 
the difference between the individual’s own consumption and a reference measure, tc .
10
 
Although the reference consumption is an endogenous variable (see below), each individual 
behaves as an atomistic agent and treats tc  as exogenous.  
The assumption that the individual’s relative consumption reflects a difference comparison 
is made for technical convenience: all qualitative results derived below will also follow – yet 
with slightly more complex mathematical expressions – if the difference comparison is 
replaced with a ratio comparison (in which the relative consumption would become /t tc c ). 
The function ( )u   defines the instantaneous utility in terms of the individual’s absolute 
consumption and use of leisure, respectively, as well as in terms of the individual’s relative 
consumption compared to the reference measure, while the function ( )   is a convenient 
reduced form allowing us to shorten some of the notation below. We assume that the function 
( )u   is increasing in each argument and strictly concave, implying that ( )   is increasing in its 
first two arguments and decreasing in the third. To be more specific, following equation (1) 
the relationships between the functions ( )   and ( )u   are c cu u   , z zu   and c u   , 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
We follow Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and define the “degree of positionality” as a 
measure of the extent to which relative consumption matters for an individual’s marginal 
utility of consumption. To be more specific, the degree of positionality represents the share of 
the overall instantaneous utility gain from increased consumption that is due to increased 
relative consumption. By using the function ( )u  , which distinguishes between absolute and 
relative consumption, the degree of positionality at time t can be written as 
                                                          
10
 Note also that leisure is assumed to be completely non-positional. This is of course questionable, yet the 
limited empirical evidence available suggests that private consumption or income is much more positional than 
leisure (Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007). 
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( , , )
(0,1)
( , , ) ( , , )
t t t
t
c t t t t t t
u c z
u c z u c z
 


 
  
 for all t.                  (2) 
Therefore, 1 t  measures the degree of non-positionality, i.e. the extent to which the 
instantaneous utility gain of increased consumption is due to increased absolute consumption 
– an entity that is always set to unity in standard economic models. As indicated in the 
introduction, empirical evidence suggests that the degree of positionality on average is in the 
interval 0.3-0.8 for income (which is interpretable as a proxy for overall consumption) in 
industrialized countries, while it may be even higher for certain visible goods such as houses 
and cars. 
 
2.2 Production and Intertemporal Maximization 
We assume that production is determined by labor and capital. Let l  denote the hours of 
work, defined by a time endowment, l , less the time spent on leisure, and k  denote the 
physical capital stock. While one may also consider other capital stocks, such as 
environmental and human capital stocks, the usefulness of genuine saving as a measure of 
welfare change does not in any way depend on the number of capital stocks in the economy. 
Therefore, to simplify the benchmark model as much as possible we refrain from considering 
other types of capital than physical capital. In Section 5, we extend the model by 
incorporating public investment to show how the treatment of such investment in genuine 
saving reflects the policy rule for contributions to a state-variable public good.  
Output is produced by a constant returns to scale technology with production function 
( , )f l k , which is such that 0lf  , 0kf  , 0llf   and 0kkf  .
11
 We suppress depreciation of 
physical capital, as it is of no concern in our context. This means that ( )f   is interpretable as 
net output (or that the depreciation rate is zero). The net investment at time t is then written in 
terms of the resource constraint as 
 ( , )t t t tk f l k c  ,                    (3) 
where the initial (time zero) capital stock, 0k , is fixed. The terminal condition can be written 
as lim 0t tk  . 
                                                          
11
 Note that the possibility of 0kkf   means that the model is consistent with an AK structure, such that the 
economy grows at a constant rate in the steady state. 
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The objective faced by each consumer is to maximize the present value of future utility. If 
expressed in terms of the function ( )  , the intertemporal objective function can then be 
written as (if measured at time 0) 
 
0 0
( , , )t tt t t tU e dt c z c e dt
 
 
   ,                   (4) 
where   is the utility discount rate. 
The social decision problem is then to choose tc  and tl  for all t to maximize the present 
value of future utility given in equation (4), subject to the resource constraint in equation (3), 
the initial capital stock, and the terminal condition. In doing this, and in contrast to individual 
consumers, the social planner also takes into account changes in the reference consumption 
tc . The corresponding present value Hamiltonian of this problem is given by (if written in 
terms of the utility formulation ( )   in equation [1]) 
 ( , , ) [ ( , ) ]p t pt t t t t t t tH c z c e f l k c
    ,                   (5) 
where   denotes the costate variable attached to the capital stock and superscript p denotes 
present value. Note also that we are considering a representative-agent economy, where 
t tc c . In addition to equation (3) and the initial and terminal conditions, the social first-order 
conditions include 
 [ ( , , ) ( , , )] t pc t t t c t t t tc z c c z c e
                     (6a) 
 ( , , ) ( , )t pz t t t t l t tc z c e f l k
                    (6b) 
 ( , )
p
p pt
t t k t t
t
H
f l k
k
 

   

,                 (6c) 
where subscripts attached to the instantaneous utility and production functions denote partial 
derivatives. For further use, we also assume that the transversality conditions 
lim 0pt t    ( 0  if lim 0t tk  )                 (6d) 
lim 0pt tH                    (6e) 
are fulfilled.
12
 Note that the left-hand side of equation (6a) reflects the social marginal utility 
of consumption, c c cu   , since the social planner recognizes that relative consumption is 
social waste. 
                                                          
12
 For a more rigorous analysis of transversality conditions in optimal control theory, see Michel (1982) and 
Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987). 
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In an unregulated economy where the consumption externality is uninternalized, the social 
first-order condition for private consumption given by equation (6a) is not satisfied. Instead of 
introducing the decision problems faced by consumers and firms in the unregulated economy 
and then characterizing the general equilibrium, we just note that the outcome of such an 
economy would be equivalent to the special case of the model set out above where the social 
planner (erroneously) treats tc  as exogenous for all t. The first-order condition for 
consumption would then change to 
 ( , , ) t pc t t t tc z c e
   ,                    (7) 
whereas the first-order condition for work hours and the equation of motion for the costate 
variable remain as in equations (6b) and (6c), respectively. 
 
3. Measuring Welfare Change in the Benchmark Model 
This section presents measures of welfare change based on the benchmark model set out 
above. We begin by considering a welfare change measure under first-best conditions in 
Subsection 3.1 and continue with the unregulated economy in Subsection 3.2. Some 
extensions of the benchmark model are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
3.1 First-Best Resource Allocation 
As a point of departure, consider first the problem of measuring welfare change along the 
first-best optimal path that obeys equations (6a)-(6c), where the externalities associated with 
relative consumption concerns are fully internalized. This constitutes a natural reference case, 
although it is presumably not very realistic. We use superscript * to denote the socially 
optimal resource allocation, such that 
 * * * ,*, , , pt t t tc l k t   
satisfy equations (4) and (6a)-(6e) along with the initial and terminal conditions for the capital 
stock, and then define the corresponding optimal value function at time t as follows: 
 * * * * ( )( , , ) s tt s s s
t
V c z c e ds

   .                   (8) 
The welfare change over the short time interval ( , )t t dt  is given by the time derivative of 
equation (8), i.e., 
 
*
* * * * *( , , )t t t t t t
dV
V V c z c
dt
    .                   (9) 
10 
 
Defining genuine saving at any time t as 
t tk , where 
p t
t t e
   denotes the current value 
shadow price of physical capital (which also equals the marginal utility of consumption) our 
first result is summarized as follows (and formally derived in Appendix): 
 
Observation 1. In a first-best optimum, genuine saving constitutes an exact measure of 
welfare change such that 
 * * *t t tV k .                   (10) 
 
Observation 1 is a standard result, which reproduces the welfare change-equivalence 
property of genuine saving in the context of the benchmark model. The left-hand side of 
equation (10) is the welfare change over the short time interval ( , )t t dt , while the right-hand 
side is interpretable as the genuine saving for the model set out above measured in units of 
utility at the first-best social optimum. While our model for simplicity only contains a one-
dimensional capital concept (or state variable), the physical capital stock, a generalization to 
several capital stocks is straightforward: the right-hand side of equation (10) would then 
simply be the sum of changes in the value of all relevant capital stocks (see also Section 5 
below). 
With reference to sustainable development, we make three broad observations based on 
earlier research. First, as indicated in the introduction, if sustainable development is 
interpreted to mean non-declining intertemporal welfare, then * * 0t tk   is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for local sustainable development, i.e., sustainable development over the 
short time interval ( , )t t dt , and * * 0t tk   is the corresponding necessary and sufficient 
condition for local unsustainable development. 
Second, negative genuine saving means that the instantaneous utility must eventually 
decline, whereas non-negative genuine saving is less informative about the equilibrium path 
of future instantaneous utilities (see Aronsson et al., 1997). By using Weitzman’s welfare 
measure, * *t tH V  (see the Appendix), and then integrating equation (8) by parts, we can 
rewrite the relationship between genuine saving and welfare as follows: 
 
* * *
* * ( )( , , ) s ts s s
t t
t
d c z c
k e ds
ds


   .               (10a) 
11 
 
Accordingly, * * 0t tk   means that the instantaneous utility must decline during some future 
time interval (for the sum on the right hand side to be negative), while * * 0t tk   only means 
that the future discounted changes in the instantaneous utilities must sum to a non-negative 
number; it does not require that all these future changes in instantaneous utilities are non-
negative. Equation (10a) is particularly interesting if we interpret the model in terms of a 
continuum of perfectly altruistic generations of consumers (instead of in terms of consumers 
with infinite planning horizons), in which case the instantaneous utility is interpretable as a 
measure of generational well-being. Third, and related to the second point, by assuming that 
the instantaneous utility is non-constant along the optimal path and that this path is unique, 
Pezzey (2004) shows that non-positive genuine saving at time t means unsustainable 
development in the sense that the (actual) instantaneous utility at time t exceeds the maximum 
sustainable instantaneous utility level.
13
 Therefore, and irrespective of which perspective we 
take, negative genuine saving contains a strong message: neither the current instantaneous 
utility nor the current intertemporal welfare level is sustainable. 
 
3.2 Unregulated Economy 
Here we analyze the probably more realistic case where the externalities associated with 
relative consumption concerns are not internalized, implying that the first-order condition for 
private consumption is given by equation (7) instead of equation (6a), and that equation (10) 
is no longer valid. Let 
  0 0 ,0, , pt t tc k t   
denote the resource allocation in the unregulated economy. As indicated above, the basic 
assumption underlying equation (7) is that consumers maximize the discounted stream of 
future utilities in a world where the positional externalities are not internalized (since all of 
                                                          
13
 Following Pezzey (2004), note that 0t tk   implies t tH  . Then, using Weitzman’s (1976) welfare 
measure t tH V , we have 
 ( ) ( )
1 s t s tH e ds e dst st
t t
H  

 
      . 
Let 
m
t  be the maximum instantaneous utility at time t that can be sustained forever. If the optimal path is 
unique and non-constant, we have 
m
t tH   and, therefore, 
m
t t tH   . 
12 
 
them treat the reference consumption as exogenous). The corresponding value function at 
time t be given by 
 0 0 0 0 ( )( , , ) s tt s s s
t
V c z c e ds

   .                 (11) 
Also, let ( , )t k t tr f l k  denote the interest rate at time t, and 
0
s
s t
t
R r d     denote the sum of 
interest rates from t to s (where s t ). Now, by using 
 0 0 0 0 0( , , )t t t t tV V c z c   ,                  (12) 
we can derive the following result: 
 
Proposition 1. In an unregulated economy with externalities caused by relative consumption 
concerns, the measure of welfare change takes the form 
 0 0 0 0 0exp( )t t t s s t s
t
V k R c ds 


 
   
 
                  (13) 
where 
0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0
( , , )
( , , ) ( , , )
t t t
t
c t t t t t t
u c z
u c z u c z
 



  
. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The right-hand side of equation (13) is written as the product of the real welfare change in 
consumption units (the expression within square brackets) and the marginal utility of 
consumption. Proposition 1 implies that the conventional measure of genuine saving, t tk , 
does not generally constitute an exact measure of welfare change in an unregulated 
economy.
14
 The second term on the right-hand side is interpretable as the value of the change 
in the marginal positional externality. To see this more clearly, note that t  measures the 
instantaneous marginal positional externality at time t, implying that t tc  denotes the change 
                                                          
14
 The insight that externalities may change the principles of measuring welfare and welfare change is, of course, 
not new. Earlier research on green national accounting shows that technological change and environmental 
externalities add additional components to measures of welfare and welfare change in unregulated economies 
(see Aronsson, Johansson and Löfgren, 1997, and Aronsson and Löfgren, 2010, as well as references therein). 
The novelties of the present paper are that it (i) shows how conspicuous consumption modifies the principles of 
measuring welfare-equivalent saving (an issue that to our knowledge has never been addressed) and (ii) by 
relating the welfare change measure to empirical measures of positional concerns. 
13 
 
in this externality over ( , )t t dt . Integrating forwards along the economy’s general 
equilibrium path gives the final component in equation (13). In particular, note that this 
component is forward looking, since the welfare function at any time t is intertemporal and 
reflects future utility. It arises because the relationship between c  and c  is not internalized, 
implying, in turn, that the model is non-autonomous time-dependent through the equilibrium 
path for c . 
Note also that in the economy with identical individuals analyzed so far, c  is always equal 
to c, implying that their growth rates will also be the same. Thus, in a growing economy in 
which c  is predominantly positive, the second term on the right-hand side of equation (13) 
will be negative and genuine saving will overestimate the welfare change. Also, the more 
positional the consumers are, i.e., the larger the  , the greater the discrepancy between the 
conventional measure of genuine saving and the welfare change, ceteris paribus. Therefore, 
empirical estimates of the degree of positionality, along with estimates of changes in the 
average consumption, are important for calculating the second term on the right-hand side of 
equation (13). Such calculations are presented in Section 7 based on data for Sweden and the 
U.S. 
The right hand side of equation (13), i.e., 
[ exp( ) ]t t s s t s
t
k R c ds 

  , 
plays exactly the same role here as the conventional genuine saving did in subsection 3.1. As 
such, it constitutes an exact measure of welfare change as well as gives the same qualitative 
information on local (un)sustainable development as the conventional genuine saving measure 
does in a first best resource allocation. However, since the second term on the right hand side 
of equation (13) is typically unobserved, an important question is that of the remaining 
informational content of t tk , i.e., the conventional genuine saving measure. In general, if we 
erroneously were to apply the genuine saving formula given by equation (10) in an 
unregulated economy, it gives little information for assessing the welfare change or of 
relevance for local sustainable development. However, in a growing economy where 
consumption typically increases along the equilibrium path, such that the second term of the 
right hand side of equation (13) is negative, t tk  can still be used for one-sided tests of 
welfare decline and local unsustainable development. More specifically, 0t tk   then implies 
(i) welfare decline and the corresponding interpretation in terms of local unsustainable 
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development, and (ii) that the instantaneous utility exceeds the maximum sustainable 
instantaneous utility level, meaning that it will eventually decline. The latter can be 
understood from an analogue to equation (10a), which in this setting is given by 
 ( )
( , , )
[ exp( ) ] s ts s st t s s t s
t
t
d c z c
k R c ds e ds
ds
 


 
    , 
where 0t tk   is a sufficient (yet not necessary) condition for the left hand side to be negative 
and, as a consequence, that the instantaneous utility will decline sometime in the future. 
  
4 Adding a Catching-up-with-the-Joneses Mechanism 
So far, we have assumed that the relative consumption comparisons are atemporal: each 
individual compares his/her current consumption with other people’s current consumption. 
Although a great deal of empirical evidence on relative consumption concerns is interpretable 
as mainly reflecting such comparisons, it is easy to argue that intertemporal consumption 
comparisons may also be relevant to consider. For example, Senik (2010) presents empirical 
evidence consistent with the catching-up-with-the-Joneses comparison by showing that 
individual well-being is higher if the individual’s standard of living exceeds that of his/her 
parents 15 years earlier, ceteris paribus. Such comparisons are also consistent with the 
empirical pattern of various financial puzzles (Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 
1999; and Díaz et al., 2003). It is therefore clearly interesting to investigate whether the 
qualitative results and interpretations presented in the previous section above carry over to a 
framework where the individual also derives utility from comparisons with other people’s 
past consumption. As will be shown, they essentially do. 
There are at least two ways of modeling such intertemporal consumption comparisons. 
One is to add a stock reflecting a weighted average of other people’s past consumption over 
the entire history of the model, as Aronsson and Löfgren (2008) did in their study on the 
comprehensive net national product under external habit formation. Another way is to assume 
that the individual directly derives utility from comparing his/her time t consumption with 
others’ consumption at time t   (and possibly other points in time as well). We use the latter 
approach as it requires less modifications of the model set out above. The instantaneous utility 
at time t is then rewritten to read 
 ( , , , ) ( , , , )t t t t t t t t tU u c z c z c c      ,                 (14) 
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where 
t t tc c     denotes the individual’s relative consumption compared with others’ past 
consumption. Thus, the instantaneous utility function is no longer time separable. All other 
aspects of the model remain as above. 
We can then distinguish between the degree of atemporal positionality (which is analogous 
to the positionality concept discussed above) and the degree of intertemporal positionality.
15
 
By using equation (14), these two measures are summarized as 
 
( , , , )
(0,1)
( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )
t t t t
t
c t t t t t t t t t t t t
u c z
u c z u c z u c z


  



 
    
               (15) 
 
( , , , )
(0,1)
( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )
t t t t
t
c t t t t t t t t t t t t
u c z
u c z u c z u c z




  

 
    
.               (16) 
As before, t  denotes the degree of atemporal positionality (with the same interpretation as 
equation (2) above) and t  the degree of intertemporal positionality at time t. The latter 
positionality concept measures the fraction of the utility gain of an additional dollar spent on 
consumption that is due to increased relative consumption compared with other people’s past 
consumption. 
Consider first the socially optimal resource allocation. Here, since the reference 
consumption measure on which the intertemporal consumption comparison is based enters the 
instantaneous utility function with a time lag, equation (6a) is replaced with 
 ( )[ ( , , , ) ( , , , )] ( , , , )
t t t
t t p
c t t t t c t t t t c t t t t tc z c c c z c c e c z c c e
  
       
 
       ,          (17) 
where the third term on the right-hand side is due to the delayed response mechanism caused 
by intertemporal consumption comparisons. The other first-order conditions remain as in 
equations (6b) and (6c). By using the same procedure as above, it is straightforward to show 
that equation (10) in Observation 1 still applies, since there are no uninternalized externalities 
that affect the welfare change measure, i.e., * * *t t tV k . 
In the unregulated economy, equation (17) is replaced by 
( , , , )
t
t p
c t t t t tc z c c e

 

  , 
which is analogous to equation (7), while the other first-order conditions remain unchanged. 
We can then derive the following analogue to Proposition 1: 
                                                          
15
 This distinction originates from Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014a), who analyze the simultaneous 
implications of keeping-up-with-the-Joneses and catching-up-with-the-Joneses types of comparisons for optimal 
taxation in an OLG model. 
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Proposition 2. In an unregulated economy, where the externalities associated with relative 
consumption concerns are driven by both keeping-up-with-the-Joneses and catching-up-with-
the-Joneses comparisons, the measure of welfare change takes the form 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0exp( ) exp( )t t t s s t s s s t s
t t
V k R c ds R c ds   
 
   
 
     
 
  .               (18) 
 
The interpretation of equation (18) is analogous to that of equation (13), with the only 
modification that the value of the marginal externality is divided in two parts in equation (18), 
which we may refer to as keeping-up and a catching-up with the Joneses externalities, 
respectively. We can observe that both kinds of externalities affect the welfare change 
measure in the same general way. Therefore, the interpretations of Proposition 1 carry over to 
Proposition 2. While this conclusion is interesting per se, it also suggests that we may skip the 
catching-up component in what follows in order to keep the model as simple and transparent 
as possible. 
 
5. Public Investments 
This section extends the benchmark model by analyzing the role of public investments. 
The implications of positional externalities for the optimal provision of public goods have 
been addressed in several studies (e.g., Ng, 1987; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008, 
2014b). Relative concerns for private consumption affect the optimal policy rule for public 
good provision via two channels: (1) an incentive to internalize positional externalities 
through increased public provision (which reduces the private consumption) and (2) an 
(indirect) incentive to reduce the public provision as relative consumption concerns lower the 
consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for public goods, ceteris paribus. In turn, this has a 
direct bearing on the way public investment ought to be reflected in the context of genuine 
saving, which motivates the following extension. 
We will, consequently, add a public good of stock character, which means that equation (1) 
changes to 
 ( , , , ) ( , , , )t t t t t t t t tU u c z g c z g c   ,                 (19) 
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where 
tg  denotes the level of the public good at time t (e.g., the state of the natural 
environment). The public good accumulates through the following differential equation:
16
 
t t tg q g   ,                (20) 
where 
tq  denotes the flow expenditure directed toward the public good at time t, i.e., the 
instantaneous contribution, and   denotes the rate of depreciation. We also impose the initial 
condition that 
0g  is fixed and the terminal condition lim 0t tg  . Finally, since part of 
output is used for contributions to the public good, the resource constraint slightly changes 
such that 
 ( , )t t t t tk f l k c q   ,                  (21) 
where   is interpretable as the (fixed) marginal rate of transformation between the public 
good and the private consumption good. 
These extensions mean that we have added the control variable q  and the state variable g  
to the benchmark model; otherwise, the model is the same as in Section 2. Thus, the social 
decision problem is to choose tc , tl , and tq  for all t to maximize the present value of future 
utility, 
 
0 0
( , , , )t tt t t t tU e dt c z g c e dt
 
 
   , 
subject to equations (20) and (21) along with initial and terminal conditions. The present 
value Hamiltonian can then be written as  
 ( , , , ) [ ( , ) ] [ ]p t p pt t t t t t t t t t t t tH c z g c e f l k q c q g
          .             (22) 
The variable pt  denotes the present value shadow price of the public good at time t, and its 
current value counterpart is given by p tt t e
  . Note that equations (6a)-(6e), if written in 
terms of the instantaneous utility function examined here (i.e., equation [19]), are necessary 
conditions also in this extended model. In addition to (the modified) equations (6), the first-
order conditions for a social optimum also include an efficiency condition for q , an equation 
of motion for p , and an additional transversality condition, i.e., 
                                                          
16
 Since the public good is interpretable in terms of environmental quality, a possible (and realistic) extension of 
equation (20) would be to assume that increased output leads to lower environmental quality (instead of just 
assuming a natural rate of depreciation). Yet, we refrain from this extension here as it is not important for the 
qualitative results derived below. 
18 
 
 p p
t t                    (23a) 
 ( , , , )
p
p t pt
t g t t t t t
t
H
c z g c e
g
   

    

              (23b) 
lim 0pt t   ( 0  if lim 0t tg  ).               (23c) 
Equations (6a)-(6e) and (23) characterize the social optimum. For further use, let us also solve 
the differential equation (23b) forward subject to the transversality condition (23c),
17
 which 
gives 
 (s t)( , , , )p st g s s s s
t
c z g c e e ds  

    .                 (24) 
As in Subsection 3.2, if the positional externality has not become internalized, equation 
(6a) should be replaced with equation (7) (again modified to reflect the instantaneous utility 
function [19] that contains the public good). This partly regulated equilibrium can be 
implemented in a decentralized setting (where the consumers choose their consumption and 
work hours at each point in time) by assuming that the planner (or government) raises revenue 
to finance the public good through lump-sum taxation, although it does not use the tax system 
to correct the individual first-order conditions for externalities. 
We are now ready to present the main results of this section. As before, to separate the 
social optimum from an allocation with uninternalized positional externalities, we use 
superscript * to denote the socially optimal resource allocation and superscript 0 to denote the 
economy with uninternalized externalities. The value function (social welfare function) at any 
time t will be defined in the same way as above, i.e., 
( )( , , , ) s tt s s s s
t
V c z g c e ds

   . 
Then, by recognizing that genuine saving now reads t t t tk g   (since the capital concept is 
two-dimensional here), we can use the same procedure as in Observation 1 and Proposition 1 
to derive an analogue to equation (10) as follows: 
 * * * *t t t tV k g     ,                (25a) 
and a corresponding analogue to equation (13): 
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 We assume that lim 0t tg  . 
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 0 0 0 0 0 0exp( )t t t t s s t s
t
V k g R c ds  


 
    
 
 .              (25b) 
Except for the public investment component, equations (25a) and (25b) are interpretable in 
exactly the same way as their counterparts in the simpler benchmark model, i.e., equations 
(10) and (13).
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Equations (25a) and (25b) together imply the following treatment of public investment: 
 
Proposition 3. Irrespective of whether the resource allocation is first best or characterized by 
uninternalized positional externalities, the accounting price of public investment is given by 
the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the private consumption 
good,  . 
 
Proposition 3 has a strong implication, as it means that the valuation of public investment 
might be based on observables and that the same valuation procedure applies in a social 
optimum and a distorted market economy. Although convenient, this result may seem 
surprising at first sight. Yet, note that the information content in   differs between the two 
regimes due to differences in the underlying policy rules for public provision. To see this 
more clearly, let 
 
g g
gc
c c
u
MRS
u u

 
 

 
denote the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private consumption 
measured with the reference consumption, c , held constant, and, following Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman (2008), 
 
g g
gc
c c c
u
CMRS
u

 
 

 
denote the corresponding marginal rate of substitution measured with the relative 
consumption,  , held constant. Therefore, gcMRS refers to a conventional marginal 
willingness to pay measure with other people’s consumption held constant. This means that 
an increase in the public good will not only imply reduced (absolute) consumption, the 
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 If we extend the model by allowing   to vary over time, e.g., due to disembodied technological change, an 
additional (forward-looking) term representing the marginal value of this technological change must be added to 
equations (25a) and (25b). 
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individual will also take into account the fact that his/her relative consumption decreases. 
gcCMRS , on the other hand, reflects each respondent’s marginal willingness to pay for the 
public good conditional on that other people have to pay the same amount, implying that 
relative consumption is held fixed. Thus, in this case there is no additional cost in terms of 
reduced relative consumption. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that 
/ (1 )gc gcCMRS MRS   .  
The policy rule for public provision in the first-best optimum can now be written as 
 
**
,( ( )) ( ( ))*
,* *1
s t s t
s gcR s t R s tt
s gc
t st t
MRS
CMRS e ds e ds
  
 
 
 
       
 
,             (26a) 
while the corresponding policy rule implicit in the economy with with uninternalized 
externalities becomes 
 
0
( ( ))0
,0
s tR s tt
s gc
t t
MRS e ds
 



    .               (26b) 
Equations (26a) and (26b) are different variants of the Samuelson condition for a state 
variable public good. In a social optimum where all positional externalities are internalized, 
the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private consumption is given by 
gcCMRS , which recognizes that relative consumption is pure waste. In the economy with 
uninternalized externalities, on the other hand, agents behave as if others’ consumption, c , is 
exogenous, meaning that the marginal rate of substitution implicit in the first-order conditions 
is given by gcMRS . In either case, however, it is optimal to equate the weighted sum of 
marginal rates of substitution with the marginal rate of transformation, which explains 
Proposition 3. There is an important practical implication here: regardless of whether we are 
in a first-best economy or market equilibrium with positional externalities, public investment 
can be valued by the instantaneous marginal cost, such that there is no need to estimate future 
generations’ marginal willingness to pay for current additions to the public good. 
 
6. Heterogeneity, Redistribution Policy and Genuine Saving 
In the preceding sections we have consistently considered a representative-agent economy, 
which is the typical framework used in earlier literature on genuine saving. In this section, we 
extend the analysis to a model where consumers are heterogeneous in terms of productivity 
and productivity is private information. As explained in the introduction, this enables us to 
generalize the study of genuine saving to a second-best economy where the social planner 
21 
 
redistributes and internalizes externalities subject to an incentive constraint.
19
 Such an 
extension is of course not without costs in terms of greater complexity and less transparency. 
However, the benefits are also considerable in terms of greater realism. Our analysis 
recognizes that an indicator of social welfare may reflect a desired distribution of welfare 
among individuals, and that this objective is costly to reach. In turn, the incentive constraint 
directly affects the marginal social value of positional externalities, which further motives this 
extension. 
We make two simplifying assumptions. First, we do not consider public investments. Since 
Proposition 3 can be shown to apply also in the model set out below, little additional insight 
would be gained from studying such investments here as well. Second, to avoid unnecessary 
technical complications with many different consumer types, we use the two-type setting 
originally developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). The consumers differ in 
productivity, and the high-ability type (type 2) is more productive (earns a higher before-tax 
wage rate) than the low-ability type (type 1).
20
 The population is constant and normalized to 
one for notational convenience, and there is a constant share, in , of individuals of type i, such 
that 1i
i
n  . 
 
6.1 Preferences and Social Decision-Problem 
We allow for type-specific differences in preferences. The instantaneous utility function 
facing each individual of type i can then be written as 
( , , ) ( , , )i i i i i i i it t t t t t tU u c z c z c   ,                 (27) 
where ci it t tc    denotes the relative consumption of type i. The functions ( )
iu   and ( )i   in 
equation (27) have the same general properties as their counterparts in equation (1). Also, and 
similarly to the benchmark model presented in Section 2, the relative consumption concerns 
in equation (27) solely reflect comparisons with other people’s current consumption, i.e., we 
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 To our knowledge, the paper by Aronsson, Cialani, and Löfgren (2012) is the only earlier study dealing with 
genuine saving in a second-best economy with distortionary taxation. Their study is based on a representative-
agent model (and as such does not consider redistribution policy) and assumes that individuals only care about 
their own absolute consumption and use of leisure (meaning that relative consumption is not dealt with at all). 
20
 Aronsson (2010) uses a similar two-type model to derive a second-best analogue to the comprehensive net 
national product. However, his study neither addresses the implications of relative consumption concerns nor 
examines genuine saving, which are the main issues here. 
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abstract from the catching-up mechanism briefly discussed above. The reference level is 
assumed to be the average consumption in the economy as a whole, 1 1 2 2
t t tc n c n c  .
21
 As 
before, each consumer is small relative to the overall economy and hence treats tc  as 
exogenous. 
In a way similar to Sections 2 and 3, it is useful to be able to measure the extent to which 
relative consumption matters for individual utility. By using the function ( )iu   in equation 
(27), we can define the degree of positionality of an individual of type i at time t such that 
 
( , , )
(0,1)
( , , ) ( , , )
i i i i
i t t t
t i i i i i i i i
c t t t t t t
u c z
u c z u c z
 


 
  
 for i=1,2, all t.               (28) 
Therefore, except that it  is type specific, it has the same interpretation as in the benchmark 
model.  Since we assume that all individuals compare their own consumption with the average 
consumption in the economy as a whole, we can define the positional externality in terms of 
the average degree of positionality. The average degree of positionality measured over all 
individuals at time t can be written as (recall that the total population size is normalized to 
unity) 
 1 1 2 2 (0,1)t t tn n     ,                  (29) 
which is interpretable as the sum of the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the positional 
consumption externality, measured per unit of consumption. Estimates of t  can be found in 
empirical literature on relative consumption concerns, as discussed above (see the 
introduction). 
The social objective is given by a general social welfare function 
  1 20
0
, tt tW U U e dt


  ,                  (30) 
and the instantaneous social welfare function, ( )  , is assumed to be differentiable and 
increasing in the instantaneous individual utilities. The resource constraint can now be written 
as 
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 This is the most common assumption in the literature dealing with optimal policy responses to relative 
consumption concerns. Although the definition of reference consumption at the individual level (i.e., whether it 
is based on the economy-wide mean value or reflects more narrow social reference groups) matters for public 
policy, it is not equally important here, where the main purpose is to characterize an aggregate measure of social 
savings.  
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 1 2( , , ) i it t t t tik f k n c  ,                  (31) 
where i i i
t tn l  is interpretable as the aggregate input of type i labor at time t. As before, the 
production function, 1 2( , , )t t tf k , is characterized by constant returns to scale. 
Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010), we assume that the social planner (or 
government) can observe labor income and saving at the individual level, while ability is 
private information. We also assume that the social planner wants to redistribute from the 
high-ability to the low-ability type. To eliminate the incentive for the high-ability type to 
mimic the low-ability type (in order to gain from this redistribution profile), we impose a self-
selection constraint such that each individual of the high-ability type weakly prefers the 
allocation intended for his/her type over the allocation intended for the low-ability type. Also, 
to simplify the analysis, we assume that the social planner commits to the resource allocation 
decided at time zero.
22
 One way to rationalize this assumption in our framework is to interpret 
the model in terms of a continuum of perfectly altruistic generations, i.e., dynasties (instead of 
single consumers with infinite lives),
23
 implying that the ability of agents living at any time t 
is not necessarily observable beforehand by the social planner. Therefore, the self-selection 
constraint is assumed to take the form 
 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2ˆ( , , ) ( , , )t t t t t t t t tU c z c c l l c U                       (32) 
for all t. The left-hand side represents the utility of the high-ability type at time t and the right-
hand side the utility of the mimicker (a high-ability type choosing the same income and 
saving as the low-ability type). The variable 
1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2/ ( , , ) / ( , , ) ( , , ) 1t t t t t t t t t t t tw w f k f k k      
denotes the relative wage rate at time t, and 1 1t t tl l   is the hours of work the mimicking high-
ability type needs to supply to reach the same labor income as the (mimicked) low-ability 
type. 
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 See Brett and Weymark (2008) for an analysis of optimal taxation without commitment based on the self-
selection approach to optimal taxation. 
23
 We realize that this interpretation is not unproblematic, since each individual in a succession of generations 
faces his/her own objective and constraints; see Michel, Thibault, and Vidal (2006) for a discussion. However, 
our main concern here is to examine the implications of the self-selection constraint for how positional 
externalities ought to be treated in savings-based measures of welfare change. Since the externality is atemporal 
in our model (i.e., a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses externality), the exact way in which successive generations 
interact is of no major importance for the qualitative results. 
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6.2 Second-Best Optimum and Genuine Saving 
The social optimum can be derived by choosing 1
tc , 
1
tl , 
2
tc , and 
2
tl  for all t to maximize the 
social welfare function given in equation (30), subject to the resource constraint and self-
selection constraint in equation (31) and (32), respectively, and to initial and terminal 
conditions for the capital stock (as before). Also, the social planner recognizes that the 
reference consumption is endogenous and given by 1 1 2 2
t t tc n c n c  .
24
 The present value 
Hamiltonian at any time t is written as 
  1 2,p t pt t t t tH U U e k   .                 (33) 
Adding the self-selection constraint gives the present value Lagrangean 
2 2ˆ[ ]p p pt t t t tL H U U   ,                  (34) 
where pt  denotes the present value Lagrange multiplier. If written in terms of the reduced 
form utility formulation ( )i   in equation (27), and by using 2 2 1 1ˆ ( , , )t t t t tc l l c     as a short 
notation for the instantaneous utility facing the mimicker at time t, the first-order conditions 
can be written as (in addition to equations [31] and [32] and the initial and terminal conditions 
for the capital stock) 
1
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 We will not go into how such an allocation can be implemented by optimal nonlinear taxation. Here, the 
reader is referred to Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010). Other literature on optimal taxation under relative 
consumption concerns includes Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 2001), 
Ireland (2001), Dupor and Liu (2003), Wendner and Goulder (2008), and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 
(2014a). 
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The optimal resource allocation also fulfills transversality conditions analogous to equations 
(6d) and (6e). In equations (35), we have suppressed the time indicator to avoid notational 
clutter (since all components refer to the same point in time), and subscripts attached to the 
instantaneous utility functions and social welfare function refer to partial derivatives (as 
before). The factor prices are determined by marginal products, i.e., 1
1 1 2( , , )w f k , 
2
2 1 2( , , )w f k , and 1 2( , , )kr f k . 
The final term on the right-hand side of equations (35a) and (35c) reflects the positional 
consumption externality and measures the partial instantaneous welfare effect of increased 
reference consumption times the effect of each type’s consumption on the reference measure. 
This partial welfare effect can be either positive or negative and is given as follows: 
1 2
1 2 2 2
, , , ,
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t c t c t t c t cU U
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
     
.                (36) 
Although the first two terms on the right-hand side are negative, since , 0t
i
t c   for i=1,2 by 
the assumptions made earlier, the third term (which is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier 
of the self-selection constraint) can be either positive or negative. We will return to equation 
(36) in greater detail below. 
We are now ready to derive a measure of welfare change for the second-best economy set 
out above. The main differences compared with the model analyzed in Sections 2 and 3 are 
that (i) the individuals differ in productivity and preferences here, meaning also that they may 
differ in terms of relative consumption concerns (see equation [28] above), (ii) the social 
planner has an objective that may necessitate redistribution policy, and (iii) the social planner 
is unable to implement the first-best resource allocation (provided that the self-selection 
constraint binds). Despite these differences, we will also in this case use superscript * to 
denote social optimum (let be a second-best optimum) such that  
 1,* 1,* 2,* 2,* * ,*, , , , , pt t t t t tc l c l k t   
satisfy equations (6d), (6e), (31), (32), and (35a)-(35e) as well as the initial and terminal 
conditions. The optimal value function at time t (based on the social welfare function) then 
becomes 
  * 1,* 1,* * 2,* 2,* * ( )( , , ), ( , , ) s tt s s s s s s
t
W c z c c z c e ds  

   .                (37) 
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We can then derive the following strong result regarding the change in social welfare over 
a short time interval, ( , )t t dt : 
 
Proposition 4. If the resource allocation satisfies equations (6d), (6e), (31), and (35a)-(35e), 
and irrespective of whether the self-selection constraint binds, genuine saving constitutes an 
exact measure of social welfare change such that 
 * * *t t tW k ,                   (38) 
where * ,*p tt t e
  . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 4 constitutes a remarkable result. It means that the procedure for measuring 
welfare change in a first-best representative-agent economy (as discussed in Section 3) carries 
over to the second-best economy analyzed here, where the agents differ in productivity, and 
where productivity is private information. The only difference is that the shadow price of 
capital is measured in a slightly different way (which is seen by comparing equations [6c] and 
[35e]). The intuition behind equation (38) is that the redistribution is optimal given the social 
welfare function and constraints, and the positional externality is internalized. As a 
consequence, there is no market failure or failure to reach the distributional objectives that 
may cause a discrepancy between the welfare change and the conventional measure of 
genuine saving.
25
 This holds true irrespective of whether the resource allocation is first best or 
second best. 
To take this discussion a bit further, note that the social welfare, as defined in equation 
(30), is non-declining (declining) over the time interval ( , )t t dt  if, and only if, * * 0t tk   
( 0 ). Consequently, non-negative genuine saving can be interpreted as an indicator of local 
sustainable development for the same reason as in Subsection 3.1, with the only modification 
that the social welfare function takes a different form here. Similarly, and again by analogy to 
the first-best model examined in Subsection 3.1, it is straight forward to show that negative 
genuine saving means that the instantaneous social welfare, 1 2( , )U U , must eventually 
decline. Therefore, the qualitative results and interpretations are analogous to those derived 
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 Aronsson and Löfgren (1999) show that if the distribution of resources among consumers is not optimal during 
a time interval, the comprehensive net national product may for this reason fail as a welfare-level measure. In 
their study, a first-best resource allocation constitutes the reference case.  
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and discussed under first-best conditions in the representative-agent model. The strong 
implication is, of course, that the results derived from the representative-agent model in 
Subsection 3.1 are more general than might be apparent at first thought. 
 
6.3 Welfare Change and Positional Externalities 
To be able to focus on the welfare contributions of uninternalized positional externalities, 
without introducing any other discrepancy from the second-best optimum, we take the same 
type of shortcut to the imperfect economy as we did in Sections 2 and 3. More specifically, 
we assume that the social planner does not internalize the positional externality, although the 
redistribution among consumer types continues to be optimal (in this case conditional on the 
equilibrium path for c ) in terms of the social welfare function described above. Thus, instead 
of examining the decision problems faced by consumers and firms in an economy without 
externality correction and then characterizing the general equilibrium, we just note that this 
equilibrium would be equivalent to the special case of the model set out in subsection 6.2 
where the planner (erroneously) treats tc  as exogenous for all t. As a consequence, the 
allocation that this planner implements means that the private consumption, hours of work, 
and the capital stock are chosen as if the consumer preference for relative consumption does 
not give rise to externalities.
26
  
In this case, the social planner’s first-order conditions for 1tl  and 
2
tl  remain as in equation 
(35b) and (35d), respectively, and the equation of motion for the shadow price remains as in 
equation (35e), whereas the first-order conditions for 1tc  and 
2
tc  reduce to read 
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 It is straight forward to implement this resource allocation in a decentralized setting with nonlinear labor and 
capital income taxation. The “optimal” marginal labor income tax rates would then take the same general form 
as those derived by Stiglitz (1982) for an economy without relative concerns. An alternative approach to the 
decentralized economy is to assume away government intervention completely, in which case none of the social 
first-order conditions would be fulfilled. With the social welfare function in equation (30), it would then be 
difficult to separate the welfare consequences of uninternalized externalities from those of a suboptimal 
distribution among individuals. 
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Now, let us return to the partial instantaneous welfare effect of increased reference 
consumption in equation (36), which is no longer internalized by the social planner. By using 
i i i
c cu u    and 
i i
c u    together with equation (28), we have 
i i i
c c    , which means that 
equation (36) can be written as 
1 2
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
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, 
where 2ˆt  denotes the degree of positionality of the mimicker at time t. Solving equation 
(39a) for 1
1 t
cU
e     and equation (39b) for 2
2 t
cU
e    , and substituting into the above 
expression gives 
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     

     
.                 (40) 
Equation (40) is analogous to a result derived by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) 
and implies that the partial welfare effect of an increase in tc  can be decomposed in two parts. 
The first term on the right-hand side depends on the average degree of positionality and is 
interpretable as the pure efficiency cost of increased reference consumption at time t, ceteris 
paribus. This is so because t  reflects the sum of marginal willingness to pay to avoid the 
externality, measured over all consumers, and the multiplication by pt  converts this number 
into utility units. The second component in equation (40) depends on the difference in the 
degree of positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type. Note that this 
component is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier of the selection constraint, which means 
that it vanishes in a first-best setting where the differences in productivity are observed by the 
social planner (in which case the self-selection constraint becomes redundant). If the 
mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type at time t such that 2 1ˆt t  , an increase 
in tc  contributes to higher welfare by relaxing the self-selection constraint, in which case the 
sign of the right-hand side of equation (40) is ambiguous. In other words, the pure efficiency 
cost of a higher tc  is accompanied by a welfare gain through this relaxation of the self-
selection constraint. On the other hand, if 2 1ˆt t  , i.e., if the low-ability type is more 
positional than the mimicker, the right-hand side of equation (40) is unambiguously negative 
since an increase in tc  in that case contributes to tighten the self-selection constraint. 
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To distinguish the resource allocation analyzed here from the second-best optimum in 
Subsection 6.2, we shall once again use the superscript 0 to denote the economy with 
uninternalized positional externalities, i.e.,  
 1,0 1,0 2,0 2,0 0 ,0, , , , , pt t t t t tc l c l k t  . 
The corresponding optimal value function becomes 
  0 1,0 1,0 0 2,0 2,0 0 ( )( , , ), ( , , ) s tt s s s s s s
t
W c z c c z c e ds  

   ,                (41) 
which measures the social welfare at time t. 
For notational convenience, define the instantaneous welfare effect of an increase in tc  
measured in consumption units (by dividing equation [40] by the shadow price of capital) 
such that 
2
2 1ˆ ˆ
p
t c
t t t tp
t
 
  

       .                 (42) 
We can then derive the following result: 
 
Proposition 5. If the economy satisfies (6d), (6e), (31), (32), (35b), (35d), (35e), (39a), and 
(39b), the measure of welfare change can be written as 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 ( )s tt t t s s s
t
W k c e ds 

    .                (43) 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 5 shows how the conventional measure of genuine saving should be modified to 
reflect the change in welfare over the short time interval ( , )t t dt , if the otherwise second-
best optimal resource allocation contains uninternalized positional externalities. As in the 
analogous measure of welfare change derived in the simpler representative-agent model in 
Section 3, the second term on the right-hand side of equation (43) – which adjusts the 
conventional genuine saving measure for these externalities – is forward looking. To be able 
to write equation (43) in exactly the same format as its counterpart in equation (13), i.e., as the 
product of the welfare change in consumption units and the marginal utility of consumption, 
we would need an additional, and simplifying, assumption; namely, that the relative wage 
rate, 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2/ ( , , ) / ( , , )t t t t t t t t tw w f k f k   , is independent of tk  for all t (which it is for 
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standard constant returns to scale production functions such as the Cobb-Douglas or CES). In 
this case, the shadow price of capital takes the simple form 
0
0
exp( )
t
t r d t       
and equation (43) can be rewritten as 
 0 0 0 0 0exp( )t t t s s t s
t
W k R c ds


 
    
 
 .                 (44) 
The only important difference between equations (13) and (44) is that the partial 
instantaneous welfare effect of increased reference consumption is no longer necessarily 
negative here, i.e., t  can be either positive or negative, while it would be unambiguously 
negative in a full information setting where the self-selection constraint does not bind (in 
which case 0pt   and 0t t     for all t). As such, the second term on the right-hand 
side of equation (44) reflects not only the pure efficiency cost of the positional externality (as 
represented by the average degree of positionality), but also that an increase in this externality 
may either facilitate or hinder redistribution. 
To be more specific, if the low-ability type is always more positional than the mimicker 
such that 1 2ˆt t   for all t, then 0t   for all t and equation (44) is interpretable in the same 
general way as the measure of welfare change in the representative-agent model in equation 
(13). However, if the mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type such that 2 1ˆt t   
during a certain time interval 1 2( , )t t t , and if this difference in degrees of positionality is 
sufficiently large, we cannot rule out that t  is positive during this time interval. As a 
consequence, an increase of the reference measure tc  through increased consumption along 
the equilibrium path may actually be associated with a net social benefit (instead of cost), 
meaning that the conventional measure of genuine saving underestimates (instead of 
overestimates) the change in social welfare. 
What determines differences in the degree of positionality between the mimicker and the 
low-ability type? In our (quite general) model where the utility functions are allowed to differ 
between types, these positionality differences may arise for a variety of reasons. To simplify 
the interpretation, consider the special case where all individuals share a common utility 
function such that the functions ( )iu   and ( )i   are the same for both types. In that case, the 
only difference between the mimicker and the low-ability type is that the mimicker spends 
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more time on leisure. Therefore, 2 1ˆ ( )t t    if the degree of positionality increases 
(decreases) with the use of leisure. Although this information is not directly observable, it is 
(at least in principle) recoverable via econometric methods. 
An implication of the above is also that the first term on the right-hand side of equations 
(43) and (44), 
t tk , is less informative here than in the context of equation (13). More 
specifically, even if we were to assume that the economy is growing such that tc  increases 
along the equilibrium path, we can no longer use 0t tk   for a one-sided test of welfare 
decline and local unsustainable development (as we did in Subsection 3.2) without making 
additional assumptions. This is so because 0t tk   does not imply that the right-hand side of 
equation (44) is negative. Since the instantaneous welfare effect of increased reference 
consumption can be either positive or negative here, 0t tk   neither implies declining 
intertemporal welfare nor that the current instantaneous social welfare in unsustainable. The 
applicability of the one sided test of welfare decline presupposes that the second term on the 
right hand side of equation (44) is negative. If tc  increases along the equilibrium path, a 
sufficient condition for this term to be negative is that 
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2 1ˆ ˆ 0
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t c
t t t tp
t
 
  

         for all t. 
This inequality is satisfied if the low-ability type is more positional than the mimicker (as 
explained above), or if the difference in the degree of positionality between the mimicker and 
the low-ability type is small enough in absolute value relative to the average degree of 
positionality. In either case, the information requirements are more demanding here. 
 
7. Numerical Illustration 
In previous sections, we have shown that conventional measures of genuine saving do not 
generally constitute valid measures of welfare change (unless the positional externality has 
become fully internalized), and we have also derived exact welfare change measures for 
economies with uninternalized positional externalities. While this is important per se, it is also 
important to be able to say something about likely orders of magnitude and whether or not the 
modifications are likely to be similar between countries in percentage terms. In this section 
we illustrate first that the discrepancies between measures of genuine saving and welfare 
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change are indeed likely to be substantial and second that these modifications may also differ 
greatly between countries.   
Our numerical simulation example is based on data for Sweden and the U.S., and serves to 
provide a rough estimate of the right-hand side of equation (44), i.e., the genuine saving 
adjusted for uninternalized positional externalities. To be able to manage this task without a 
lengthy numerical extension of the paper, we make four additional, simplifying assumptions: 
(i) all consumers share a common utility function where leisure is weakly separable from the 
other goods, (ii) the positionality degree is constant over time for all consumers, (iii) the 
interest rate is constant over time, and (iv) the average consumption in the economy can be 
approximated by a consumption function with a constant growth rate. 
Assumption (i) means that the mimicker and the mimicked agent are equally positional, 
i.e., 2 1ˆt t  , implying, in turn, that the second term on the right-hand side of equation (42) 
vanishes.
27
 Taken together, assumptions (i) and (ii) imply t t       for all t,
28
 while 
assumption (iii) implies tr r  for all t. Finally, assumption (iv) is consistent with models 
used in literature on endogenous growth and implies that we can write the average 
consumption at any time s t  as 
 ( )s ts tc c e
  ,                   (45) 
where   is the growth rate. 
Our aim is now to operationalize the welfare change measure given in equation (44). As 
such, the calculations below presuppose that the positional externality is uninternalized, while 
all other aspects of public policy are optimally chosen conditional on the level of reference 
consumption. By using assumptions (i)-(iv), equation (44) can be written in the following 
convenient way:
29
 
                                                          
27
 To our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence available here, which suggests that the relationship between 
the degree of consumption positionality and the use of leisure is a relevant issue for future research. Therefore, 
lack of empirical evidence on this relationship motivates us to assume leisure separability. 
28
 Assumption (ii) can alternatively be replaced with a functional form assumption on the instantaneous utility 
function, such that the degree of positionality is constant over time; see, e.g., Ljunqvist and Uhlig (2000). 
29
 Since assumption (i) eliminates any difference in the degree of positionality between the mimicker and the low 
type, the second line of equation (46) would also follow from the welfare change measure of the representative-
agent model given in equation (13). 
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.                 (46) 
The left-hand side of equation (46) is a money-metrics version of the welfare change (through 
division by the marginal utility of consumption), while the right-hand side decomposes this 
into the conventional genuine saving (GS) and the value of the change in the marginal 
positional externality (ME). In particular, note that the higher the average degree of 
positionality,  , or the higher the consumption growth rate,  , ceteris paribus, the larger the 
marginal externality will be, and the more the conventional measure of genuine saving will 
overestimate the welfare change. 
To estimate equation (46), we use data from Sweden and the U.S. for the period 1990-
2012. Our point of departure is the World Bank measure of adjusted net saving, which we 
interpret as a conventional indicator of genuine saving that does not reflect any positional 
externalities (i.e., our GS above).
30
 We shall then examine how this measure ought to be 
modified in response to uninternalized positional externalities through the second term on the 
right-hand side of equation (46). The raw data contains information on the adjusted net 
saving, aggregate private consumption, total population, and the GDP deflator, allowing us to 
calculate both the conventional genuine saving and the value of the marginal externality in 
real per capita terms.
31
 We use per capita variables to avoid possible welfare consequences of 
population size and growth (which we have abstracted from above). The average degree of 
positionality is assumed to be in the interval 0.2-0.4, which is thus a conservative assumption 
given the empirical research discussed in the introduction. The calculations are presented in 
Table 1. 
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 The adjusted net saving is defined as the net national savings plus education expenditure minus an 
estimated value of energy depletion, mineral depletion, forest depletion, carbon dioxide emissions, and 
particulate emissions damage. We realize, of course, that this definition captures several aspects not addressed 
above (mainly referring to valuation of human capital and environmental capital). Yet, our more narrow 
definition of net investment is not important here, since adding investments in human and environmental capital 
does not affect any of the qualitative results derived above. In fact, we showed in Section 5 that a straightforward 
extension of the model would allow us to reinterpret k  to reflect a broader capital concept. 
31
 These data are from the database World Development Indicators of the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
34 
 
 
Table 1 HERE 
 
The numbers in Table 1 should be seen for what they are, i.e., the outcome of a 
computational example and not the result of empirical research. With this reservation in mind, 
we would nevertheless like to emphasize three important insights from the table. First, the 
value of the change in the marginal positional externality is substantial. Note that this is so 
despite our quite conservative estimates of the average degree of positionality,  . Indeed, 
even based on the lower-bound estimate of 0.2, we obtain quite large values of ME. This 
suggests that the conventional measure of genuine saving may largely overestimate the true 
welfare change. Second, the conventional measure of genuine saving may give incorrect 
qualitative information as to whether the development is locally sustainable. For several 
combinations of growth rate, interest rate, and average degree of positionality, GS-ME is less 
than zero despite that GS is positive. Third, this discrepancy will generally not be similar 
between countries. In our case, the discrepancy is considerably larger for the U.S. than for 
Sweden, as the conventional genuine saving is smaller and the per capita consumption larger 
in the U.S. than in Sweden. 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper deals with the measurement of welfare change by developing an analogue to 
genuine saving in an economy where the consumers are positional. Recent empirical evidence 
shows that people derive utility from their own consumption relative to that of referent others, 
and also that the corresponding negative externalities might be substantial, implying that 
measures of social savings ought to be modified accordingly. This is further emphasized by 
the now widely accepted role that genuine saving plays as an indicator of local sustainable 
development. 
In the context of first-best representative-agent economies, earlier research shows that the 
genuine saving is an exact indicator of welfare change and also interpretable as an exact 
indicator of local sustainable development. We show that this result carries over to a second-
best economy based on asymmetric information about individual productivity and a binding 
self-selection constraint, in the sense that the change in social welfare (measured by a general 
social welfare function) over a short time interval is exactly equal to the genuine saving. We 
also show how the value of public investment affects genuine saving and derive a simple 
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accounting price that applies irrespective of whether or not the positional externalities have 
become internalized. 
However, in the arguably more interesting case where the positional externality has not 
become fully internalized, the equality between welfare change and genuine saving no longer 
applies, and we show how this discrepancy depends on the degrees of positionality (i.e., 
measures used in empirical literature to indicate the extent to which relative consumption 
matters for individual well-being). In a representative-agent model, and if the consumption 
increases along the general equilibrium path (which the ideas of a positional arms race may 
suggest), uninternalized positional externalities typically imply that the genuine saving 
overestimates the change in social welfare. As such, negative genuine saving can still be used 
as an indicator of local unsustainable development, i.e., negative genuine saving implies that 
the social welfare declines.  
In an economy with productivity differences and asymmetric information, the conventional 
measure of genuine saving is even less informative. Indeed, if the positional externalities are 
not internalized we can in this case not any longer use negative genuine saving as an indicator 
of local unsustainable development. We also demonstrate in a numerical exercise that the 
modifications are in general likely to be substantial and that they are likely to differ between 
countries to a large extent. 
Future research may take several possible directions. First, recent empirical evidence 
shows that individuals do not only compare their own consumption with that of other 
domestic residents, they also engage in between-country comparisons (Becchetti et al., 2013). 
This suggests to us that a multi-country framework might be useful in future research on 
genuine saving. We conjecture that genuine saving is less useful as an indicator of welfare 
change at the national level in such a setting. Second, although empirical evidence shows that 
people are concerned with their relative consumption, people are also found to have an 
aversion against too much inequality. This suggests that it might be relevant to extend the 
analysis of genuine saving by allowing also for other types of social comparisons. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
The Benchmark Model 
The value function is given by 
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 ( )( , , ) s tt s s s
t
V c z c e ds

   .                (A1) 
Differentiating equation (A1) with respect to t gives 
 ( , , )t t t t tV V c z c   .                 (A2) 
To write equation (A2) in the format of equation (10) or (13), we must find an expression for 
tV . 
Proof of Observation 1 
Differentiating the present value Hamiltonian in equation (5) with respect to time and 
using t tc c  gives 
 ( , , )
p p p p p
tt t t t t
t t t t t t t
t t t t
dH H H H H
c z c e c l k
dt c l k
 

         
   
.              (A3) 
The first term on the right-hand side is the direct effect of time through the utility discount 
factor, while the remaining three terms represent indirect effects of time through the control, 
state, and costate variables. Equations (5), (6a), (6b), and (6c) imply 
/ / 0p pt t t tH c H l      , /
p
t t tH k    , and /
p
t t tH k   , and equation (A3) reduces to 
 ( , , )
p
tt
t t t
dH
c z c e
dt
   .                 (A4) 
Solving equation (A4) forward subject to the transversality condition lim 0pt tH   implies 
 ( , , ) s ps s s t
t
c z c e ds H 

  .                (A5) 
Multiplying both sides of equation (A5) by te  gives Weitzman’s (1976) welfare measure 
t tV H  . Substituting into equation (A2) and using ( , , )t t t t t tH c z c k    gives equation 
(10). 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Differentiating equation (5) totally with respect to time, while treating tc  as a separate 
variable, we can rewrite equation (A3) as 
                   ( , , )
p p p p p p
tt t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t
dH H H H H H
c z c e c l k c
dt c l k c
 

           
    
.        (A6) 
Then, by using equations (6b), (6c), and (7), equation (A6) simplifies to 
 ( , , )
p
t tt
t t t t t t
dH
c z c e e c
dt
       ,                (A7) 
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where we have used /p t t p tt t c t c t t t tH c e e e
                 . Solving equation 
(A7) forward subject to lim 0pt tH  , and multiplying by 
te  to convert into current value, 
gives 
 ( )s tt t s s s
t
V H c e ds  

    .                (A8) 
Substitute equation (A8) into equation (A2) and use ( , , )t t t t t tH c z c k    
 ( )s tt t t s s s
t
V k c e ds  

    .                (A9) 
Using / exp( ( ))
s
s t
t
r d s t       , and substituting into equation (A9), gives equation 
(13). 
 
The Model with Heterogeneous Consumers 
The social welfare function is given by 
  1 1 2 2 ( )( , , ), ( , , ) s tt s s s s s s
t
W c z c c z c e ds  

   .             (A10) 
The welfare change measure can then be written as 
  1 1 2 2( , , ), ( , , )t t s s s s s sW W c z c c z c     .              (A11) 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Differentiating the present value Lagrangean in equation (34) with respect to time, and 
using that the first-order conditions in equations (35a)-(35e) are fulfilled, gives 
  1 1 2 2( , , ), ( , , )
p
tt
t t t t t t
dL
c z c c z c e
dt
     .             (A12) 
By solving equation (A12) in the same way as we solved equation (A4) above, and using that 
p p
t tL H , the proof follows by analogy to the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Differentiating the present value Lagrangean in equation (34) with respect to time, while 
using the first-order conditions in equations (35c), (35d), (35e), (39a), and (39b), gives 
  1 1 2 2( , , ), ( , , )
p
t tt
t t t t t t t t t
dL
c z c c z c e e c
dt
         ,           (A13) 
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where we have used /p p tt t t t t tL c e
        . Solving equation (A13) forward subject to 
the transversality condition lim 0pt tH  , using 
p p
t tL H , and multiplying by 
te   to 
convert into current value terms, gives 
  1 1 2 2 ( ) ( )( , , ), ( , , ) s t s ts s s s s s t s s s
t t
c z c c z c e ds H c e ds     
 
       .           (A14) 
Substituting into equation (A11) and using  1 2,t t t t tH U U k    gives equation (43). 
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Table 1 A computation example  
              Sweden   U.S. 
(i) 0.01 and 0.03r    
GS         ME          GS-ME      GS            ME            GS-ME 
0.2   6.26       1.81          4.45                          3.84          2.64              1,20 
0.4   6.26       3.61          2.65                          3.84          5.27               -1.43             
(ii) 0.02 and 0.04r    
GS         ME          GS-ME      GS            ME            GS-ME 
0.2   6.26       3.61            2.65                         3.84          5.27               -1.43 
0.4   6.26       7.23          -0.97                         3.84        10.55              -6.71              
Note: All numbers are given in thousands of U.S. dollars at the 2005 price level. To avoid yearly fluctuations, 
the calculations are based on mean values for the genuine saving per capita and aggregate consumption per 
capita over the period 1990-2012. 
 
 
 
